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Abstract: We examine the behavior of remittances over the business cycle and their 
potential to act as a “stabilizer” during periods of high business cycle volatility. 
Two main findings are reported. First, remittances are less volatile than other 
foreign currency flows and do not appear to systemically comove with business 
cycle fluctuations. Second, remittances are relatively stable even during episodes 
of sharp business cycle volatility, such as those associated with sudden stops and 
financial crises. We also provide an overview of the theoretical literature on the 
implications of different motives to remit for the cyclical behavior of remittances. 
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Remittances to developing countries since 2000 have been significant both as a share of 
GDP and compared with foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development 
assistance (ODA) (Figures 1 and 2). Some studies report that remittances support 
household consumption following natural disasters or other economic shocks.1 Given their 
size and the fact that they are used to fund consumption needs of the recipients, 
remittances have the potential to counterbalance adverse output effects during economic 
downturns and sudden stops in capital flows.  
However, the potential of remittances to help mitigate the adverse effects of shocks is 
directly related to their behavior over the business cycle. If remittances are procyclical, 
meaning that they increase during expansions and decline during downturns, they will 
likely exacerbate the cycle. If, on the other hand, remittances are acyclical or 
countercyclical, then they have the potential to help moderate economic fluctuations. 
In theory, the behavior of remittances over the cycle is related to the motives to remit. 
In the broadest categorization, remittances can be driven by either altruism or self-interest 
(Lucas and Stark, 1985; Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2006). In the former case, 
remittances are believed to be unrequited transfers without expectations of personal gain 
sent to relatives during large shocks and tend to be countercyclical. In the latter case, 
remittances are usually used for investment in the home country and are likely to be 
procyclical with respect to the business cycle of the recipient economy.  
The empirical literature on the cyclical behavior of remittances has been inconclusive. 
Some studies find that remittances are largely altruistic and countercyclical with respect 
to the recipient economy (Frankel, 2011; Bettin et al., 2015). Other studies challenge these 
results and report that the investment-driven, procyclical tendency may be more prevalent 
(Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz, 2008; Guiliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009). Whereas countercyclical 
remittances flows can mitigate macroeconomic volatility, procyclical flows have the 
potential to deepen it (Durdu and Sayan, 2010; Acosta et al., 2009).2 The behavior of 
remittances during episodes of elevated macroeconomic volatility, such as current account 
reversals and financial crises, remains understudied in the literature. 
Because of the limited research on the dynamic patterns of remittances, many important 
questions remain unanswered. This paper examines the behavior of remittances over the 
 
1 For example, following the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, remittance inflows grew by more than 6 percentage points 
compared to the previous year, and continued to grow in the subsequent years. Yang and Choi (2007) find that 
remittance inflows made up for about 60 percent of declines in household income in the Philippines following El Nino 
rainfall shocks (for other work on the topic, see Yang, 2008; Bettin and Zazzaro, 2018). 
2 A few studies have investigated the ability of remittances to help reduce macroeconomic volatility. These studies 
vary in country coverage and methodology. Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2011); Craigwell et al. (2010); Bugamelli 





business cycle and their potential to act as a “stabilizer” during periods of high business 
cycle volatility. Specifically, it addresses three main questions: First, what does theory 
imply about the behavior of remittances over the business cycle? Second, what is the 
behavior of remittances over the business cycle and how does that compare with the 
behavior of other types of inflows, such as FDI, portfolio equity, and ODA? Third, how 
do remittances fluctuate during sudden stops and financial crises?  
Our analysis adds to the literature in several ways: First, it documents a number of 
stylized facts about the cyclical behavior of remittances. More specifically, it examines the 
cyclical features of remittances for a widely inclusive set of 109 countries for the period 
1980–2015. It also provides a comparison of different methodologies used in the literature 
to analyze the cyclical features of remittances. Second, it investigates the behavior of 
remittances during episodes of sudden stops and financial crises. Finally, it provides a 
broad overview of the theoretical literature on the motives to remit and the implications 
that these motives have for the behavior of remittances over the business cycle. 
The main empirical findings are the following: First, remittances are largely acyclical with 
respect to the recipient country. Second, remittances are less volatile than other types of 
inflows, including FDI and ODA. At the same time, remittances are less procyclical than 
financial flows, but more procyclical than ODA. Finally, remittances display resilience 
during sudden stops and financial crises. Whereas capital inflows decline sharply during 
these episodes, remittances stay stable. These results suggest that remittances can help 
counterbalance the effects of volatile financial flows.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a broad overview of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the motives to remit. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 
documents the cyclicality and volatility of remittances. Section 5 analyzes the behavior of 
remittances during sudden stops and financial crises. Section 6 offers some concluding 
remarks and suggestions for future work. 
 
2. Cyclical Behavior of Remittances in Theory 
In theory, the cyclical properties of remittances are closely related to the motives that 
drive remittances. At the individual level, these motives have direct implications for the 
amount, timing, and frequency of remittances. At the aggregate level, they may affect the 
volume of flows and their variability over the business cycle, in both the remittance-
recipient (home) and origin (host) countries. This section briefly discusses the drivers of 
remittances and their implications for the cyclical features of remittances with respect to 
the origin and recipient economies. Remittances are driven by either altruistic motives or 
self-interest. In the former case they usually tend to be countercyclical. In the latter case, 




Among motives that drive remittances, the most basic distinction is between altruistic 
motives and those driven by self-interest. Whereas altruistic motives are not linked to any 
past contracts or expectations related to personal gain, the self-interest motive implies an 
exchange in which remittances are a resource belonging to the remitter that is exchanged 
for goods and services that provide utility to the remitter. A more detailed classification 
of motives includes altruism, insurance, strategic considerations, exchange, inheritance, 
and investment (Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). The relationship between these motives 
and possible responses of remittances to changes in remittance-recipient (home) country 
GDP and origin (host) GDP are presented in Table 1. In theory, the first three motives 
are expected to lead to a countercyclical relationship between remittances and GDP 
fluctuations in the home country whereas the last three produce a procylical one.  
Motives that lead to countercyclical remittances 
Altruistic. If the motivations are altruistic, remittances would increase when the receiving 
economy is in a downturn and vice versa. This would imply a negative relationship 
between remittances and recipient economy GDP resulting in countercyclicality. Higher 
GDP in the origin country is likely to increase altruistic remittances.  
Insurance. Because of the absence of means to cover risks arising from variability of income 
and employment in their home countries (such as unemployment insurance), members of 
a household migrate to another country whose business cycles are not correlated with 
those of the home country. The migrant and the family members left behind enter into 
an arrangement whereby the former sends remittances to cope with hard times while the 
latter pay for costs of migration.3 The insurance motive leads to countercyclicality since 
remittances help moderate the impact of an adverse shock in the recipient country. 
Strategic considerations. These arise from a view that prospective employers may not be 
able to initially ascertain the productivity of immigrant workers and consequently pay 
them according to the average productivity of their migrant community or country group. 
This circumstance induces higher-productivity migrants to send remittances as “bribes” 
to lower-productivity potential migrants to encourage them to stay in the home country. 
In this case, decreased income opportunities at home may increase the propensity of those 
left behind to migrate, so more remittances may have to be sent to compensate them. 




 Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) find evidence of the opposite arrangement whereby the family provides insurance 




Motives that lead to procyclical remittances 
Exchange. The exchange motive implies that remittances “purchase” certain services like 
taking care of property or relatives (elders or children). Improvements in the recipient 
country’s economy could increase the price of services and the returns the recipients could 
get from activities other than that mandated by the sender. This would lead to 
procyclicality with regard to the recipient economy.  
Inheritance. The migration process is viewed as an arrangement that involves an informal 
contract whereby the family finances the migrant with the understanding that a future 
stream of remittances will accrue to them. Potential inheritances act as an enforcement 
device to ensure that migrants do not renege on their promise or encourage them to send 
higher amounts in the hope of receiving a favorable share of the bequest (Hoddinot, 1994). 
In this case higher GDP in the recipient country increases the value of the bequest and 
prompts more remittances. This would again lead to procyclicality. 
Investment. The investment motive implies that families send migrants to increase the 
family’s income. In this case, remittances are a return on the deployment of human capital. 
The family members then act as agents managing the funds on behalf of the remitter and 
this becomes similar to the exchange model. If investment is the motive, improved 
economic circumstances in the recipient country would increase remittances, leading to 
procyclicality.  
The cyclical response to changes in sending-country GDP may be indeterminate in the 
case of insurance- or investment-driven remittances. If migrants retain income 
opportunities in a downturn, remittances under both motives may increase. This outcome 
is more likely if returns on assets in the origin country are lower than in the recipient 
economy. This would lead to countercyclicality with respect to the sending country’s 
GDP.4 However, if the migrant loses income opportunities in the origin country because 
of the downturn, remittances would be procyclical with respect to its GDP.  
3. Data 
The sample comprises observations primarily from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators.5 The data are unbalanced and cover the period 1980–2015 for 109 countries. 
Table A1 in Appendix provides a list of all variables used, together with the source for 
each variable. The dataset includes 27 advanced economies, 28 emerging market 
 
4 There can also be mixed motives. More complex theoretical formulations encompass merit goods whereby the 
remittances recipient renders nonmarket services. 
5 For details on the remittances data, including issues related to measurement and underreporting, see Clemens and 




economies, and 54 other developing economies. Remittances include personal transfers 
and compensation of employees, which are both items in the balance of payments 
framework. A large number of emerging market and developing economies have received 
substantial inflows of capital as well as remittances during the 2006-2015 period. We 
examine these countries in a separate country group, namely the Remittance and Capital 
Flow Intensive countries (RCI group). The RCI group includes countries that have, on 
average, experienced ratios of remittances to GDP higher than 1 percent during 2006-
2015 period and either FDI inflows greater than 3.5 percent or equity inflows greater than 
1 percent of GDP, on average, during the same period (the cutoffs correspond to median 
values for the full sample).  
Remittances as a share of GDP are comparable to FDI flows and higher than portfolio 
equity inflows. For developing economies and RCI countries, remittances surpass FDI and 
ODA flows (Figure 2). Summary statistics are provided in Table 2. In developing 
economies, remittances, on average, amount to close to 80 percent of reserves, and, in a 
large number of countries, remittances constitute the single largest source of foreign 
exchange.6 
4. Cyclical Features of Remittances 
This section examines the question of how remittances behave during business cycle 
fluctuations and other large macroeconomic shocks. The analysis is carried out in several 
steps. First, the comovement of remittance inflows with GDP is analyzed using 
unconditional correlations. Second, remittances’ comovement with other types of foreign 
currency flows is examined, along with how they differ in volatility. Third, the behavior 
of remittances during sudden stops and financial crises is studied.  
When analyzing the time-series properties of variables in macroeconomics, it is common 
practice to detrend the series by using different types of filters. These filters basically 
eliminate both the long-term trend and any rapidly varying or irregular movements, 
leaving behind only the relevant cyclical variation in the time-series under consideration. 
Cyclicality is defined here as the correlation between the detrended series of GDP and the 
relevant flow. Each series is decomposed into trend and cyclical components using the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter for the period 1980–2015. Following Ravn and Uhlig (2002), a 
smoothing parameter of 6.25 is used for annual data. The robustness of the main findings 




 For example, remittances as a percentage of GDP are high for Tajikistan (32 percent), the Kyrgyz Republic (33 
percent), Nepal (28 percent), Moldova (20 percent), Haiti (29 percent), Honduras (19), El Salvador (20), and many 
other countries. They are large as a percentage of exports for Tajikistan (467 percent), Nepal (418 percent), and Haiti 
(229 percent), among others. Remittances as a percentage of reserves are high for Tajikistan (542 percent), Pakistan 
(191 percent), El Salvador (144 percent), Egypt (108 percent), Honduras (104 percent), and the Kyrgyz Republic (102 




Foreign currency inflows are classified as (1) procyclical if the correlation between output 
and the cyclical component of flows is positive and statistically different from zero; (2) 
countercyclical if it is negative and statistically different from zero; and (3) acyclical if 
the correlation is not statistically different from zero.7 Remittances are acyclical in 
approximately 80 percent of countries (Figure 3). Remittances appear to be more 
procyclical for high-remittances countries and RCI countries (28.6 and 39.7, respectively), 
suggesting that in several countries in those groups, remittances are more prone to 
exacerbate business cycle movements in the recipient economy. At the same time, on 
average, remittances are not correlated with capital inflows.8  
 
The median correlation coefficient of remittances with GDP is 0.06, ranging from -0.03 
for the group of emerging market economies, to 0.18 for the RCI countries group (Table 
3). How do these results compare with other studies that use cross-country data? As 
mentioned in the introduction, some studies find that remittances are negatively 
correlated with output fluctuations in the recipient economies (Frankel, 2011; Bettin et 
al., 2015).9 In contrast, other studies find that remittances are positively correlated with 
income in the recipient countries (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009; Sayan, 2006; Cooray 
and Mallick, 2013). Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2014) argue that cyclicality of remittances 
with respect to the receiving economy can be country or corridor specific.  
 
Our findings suggest that remittances are mostly acyclical, with variations across 
countries.10 Remittances are not strongly correlated with capital flows either, with the 
median correlation equal to 0.08. These flows have been found to behave procyclically in 
emerging markets and developing countries (Kaminsky et al., 2005). Across different 
groups, remittances are weakly correlated with portfolio equity flows, total inflows, ODA, 
and net exports. Overall, remittances appear to be a more stable (less volatile) source of 
external resources than financial inflows, including ODA.11  
 
 
7 This approach is quite standard in the business cycle literature (Kydland and Prescott, 1990; Pallage and Robe, 2001). 
8 Refer to Table A2 for further details about the cyclicality of remittances and other flow for each country group. 
9
 Singh et al. (2011), Combes et al. (2014), Bugamelli and Paterno (2011), and Chami et al., (2012) analyze this issue. 
These studies differ significantly in the data and methodology they employ. Some focus on single countries or regions. 
For example, Bettin et al. (2015) study remittances from Italian provinces to developing countries. Studies focusing 
on earlier time periods are more susceptible to measurement issues in remittances data (Clemens and McKenzie, 
2014). With respect to migrants’ host countries, Bettin et al. (2012) find that positive shocks to host-country GDP are 
likely to translate into larger remittances. 
10
 This heterogeneity strengthens the argument that the effects of remittances on the macroeconomy should be 
evaluated in a general equilibrium framework that takes into account country-specific conditions, as in Durdu and 
Sayan (2010). 
11
 The results are broadly similar when volatility is defined as the coefficient of variation (standard deviation of the 
series over the sample period normalized by the mean of the corresponding flow). These findings are also in line with 




As a further robustness check, the cyclicality of remittances is calculated following 
different methodologies used in previous work that studies business cycle properties of 
foreign currency flows. The results are shown in Table 4. Broner et al. (2013) look at the 
correlations between growth of real GDP and the de-meaned financial flow that is 
normalized by dividing by trend GDP. The results from this method are similar in 
magnitude to the previous results of this analysis, confirming the main findings.12 Another 
important study, Kaminsky et al. (2005), uses the cyclical component of real GDP and 
the nominal value of capital flows to establish the cyclicality of financial flows. The present 
paper finds higher correlations for each country group (and a higher percentage of 
procyclical countries). This outcome is not unexpected, because inherently prices may be 
correlated with GDP and this method would produce higher correlations.13  
 
Chami et al. (2012) calculate the correlations between the cyclical component of real GDP 
and remittances divided by GDP. By construction, the two variables are expected to be 
negatively correlated. The present exercise finds, on average, low negative correlations, 
similar to those reported by Chami et al. (2012). This correlation would be interesting if 
it suggested procyclicality or acyclicality and should be of no surprise if the result is 
negative (Column 4 of Table 4). A similar argument can be made when using the Pallage 
and Robe (2001) methodology, in which the authors divide the flow (of aid) by the import 
price deflator. Our calculations show that import prices are positively correlated with 
GDP, and by construction, the results would be biased toward negative correlations.  
 
To sum up, capital flows, such as FDI and debt flows, are often procyclical. As such, they 
can exacerbate output fluctuations and contribute to the volatility of consumption in 
emerging market and developing economies.14 Although remittances are not necessarily 
countercyclical, their acyclicality suggests that they have the potential to at least provide 
some stability for the balance of payments, and hence for the economy more generally, 
when capital inflows decline. The next section examines whether these broad trends about 








 This method is more suitable if the series were to be used in cross-country regressions, which is what Broner et al. 
(2013) do. 
13
 Despite the inherent bias toward a positive correlation, only 38.5 percent of the countries exhibit procyclical 
behavior of remittances, and in about 55 percent of the sample remittances appear to be acyclical (Column 3 of Table 
4). 
14 Kaminsky et al. (2005) also show that capital flows are highly procyclical. Contessi et al. (2013) document that the 
components of inward capital flows are also procyclical for the group of G7 economies. Islamaj (2014) shows that 




5. Behavior of Remittances during Periods of Large Macroeconomic Shocks 
 
The resilience of remittances over the business cycle is one argument for supporting the 
stabilizing role that they may bring to emerging market and developing economies. 
However, the cycles in emerging market and developing economies are often exacerbated 
by sharp capital flow reversals and financial crises. How do remittances behave during 
these major episodes of macroeconomic and financial volatility?  
 
To answer this question, the behavior of remittances during sudden stops and financial 
crises is analyzed. A sudden stop, defined as a sharp decline in gross capital inflows, is 
often associated with increased risk of macroeconomic volatility and financial crises in 
emerging market and developing economies. The timing of sudden stops can be identified 
using a variety of methodologies. This exercise follows the methodology of Forbes and 
Warnock (2012) and identifies a large number of sudden stops over during the period 
1990–2015. Table A3 in the Appendix provides a complete list of sudden-stop episodes. 
 
The global financial crisis starting in 2008 saw a plethora of sudden stops in capital 
inflows. In contrast, remittances showed slight above-trend growth during the financial 
crisis (Figure 4). The same pattern is observed during previous, less severe and less 
synchronized crisis episodes, with remittances generally displaying resilience, while capital 
inflows gyrate. The results are similar for other country groupings, including for emerging 
markets and RCI economies taken separately (Table 5).  
 
Whereas capital flows, on average, decline about 14.8 percent during the initial year of a 
sudden stop episode and continue to fall by another 10 percent the following year, 
remittances tend to increase by 6.6 percent during the first year and another 5.7 percent 
in the subsequent year. Moreover, remittances are resilient in emerging markets and RCI 
economies taken separately, even though the decline in capital inflows for these country 
groups is often sharper than for other groups. During the first year of a sudden stop, 
capital inflows to emerging markets fall 25.2 percent, on average, whereas remittances 
increase by 6.8 percent (Table 6). 
 
Remittances also show resilience during financial crises, including banking, currency, and 
sovereign debt crises. We use the dates of financial crises from the database of Laeven 
and Valencia (2013. We compare the behavior of remittances with that of other types of 
capital inflows during crises. Although capital inflows have been feeble, remittances are 
stable during crises. Compared with two years before a crisis starts, total capital inflows 
fall, on average, by as much as 65 percent two years after the onset of a currency crises, 
whereas remittances appear to be 15 percent higher. The difference is even starker for 




increase by 24 percent. For any crisis, two years after the onset remittances increase, on 
average, by 18 percent compared with two years before the crisis, whereas total inflows 
fall by as much as 80 percent during the same period (see Tables A4-A5 for details). These 





We analyze the behavior of remittances over the business cycle and during episodes of 
large macroeconomic shocks, such as sudden stops and financial crises. The analysis is 
carried out in three steps. First, the cyclical properties of remittances in theory are 
reviewed. Our brief review of theory suggests that these properties are closely related to 
the motives that drive remittances. Remittances are driven by either altruistic motives or 
self-interest. In the former case they usually tend to be countercyclical. In the latter case, 
they are largely procyclical. 
 
Second, we analyze the cyclicality of remittances over the business cycle using a large 
sample of countries for the period 1980–2015. The findings suggest that remittances are 
relatively stable and acyclical. In contrast, debt flows and FDI are procyclical. Stability 
and acyclicality imply that remittances have the potential to support activity in the face 
of economic adversity. This finding is particularly important in emerging market and 
developing economies, where remittances are used to finance household consumption 
directly. Third, we study the behavior of remittances during episodes of elevated 
macroeconomic volatility. Remittances have been stable during these episodes, including 
sudden stops and financial crises. Remittances are quite resilient even in countries with 
large remittance inflows. 
 
These results point to multiple avenues for future research. First, there is a considerable 
degree of heterogeneity in the cyclicality of remittances across countries. Future research 
could usefully investigate the sources of this heterogeneity and seek to identify the 
conditions under which remittances help lower macroeconomic volatility. For example, a 
more structural approach based on the estimation of a model of remittances that account 
for country-specific characteristics could offer further insights into cross-country variation 
in the extent of cyclicality. Second, it would be useful to employ a general equilibrium 
model to have a better grasp of the behavior of remittances and other capital flows in 
response to different types of shocks. Finally, it is known that macroeconomic stability 
promotes economic growth. In light of our findings, it would be a fruitful avenue to study 







Acosta, P. A., L. Emmanuel K.K. , and F. S. Mandelman. 2009. "Remittances and the 
Dutch disease," Journal of International Economics, vol. 79(1), pages 102‐116. 
Alvarez, S. P., P. Briod, O. Ferrari, and U. Rieder. 2015. “Remittances: How reliable are 
the data?”, Migration Policy Practice V(2): 42-46. 
Amuedo-Dorantes, C., and S. Pozo. 2006. “Remittance as Insurance: Evidence from 
Mexican Immigrants.” Journal of Population Economics 19 (2): 227–54. 
Amuedo-Dorantes, C., and S. Pozo. 2011. “Remittances and Income Smoothing.” 
American Economic Review 101 (3): 582–87. 
Bettin, G., R. Lucchetti, and A. Zazzaro. 2012. “Endogeneity and Sample Selection in a 
Model for Remittances.” Journal of Development Economics 99 (2): 370–84. 
Bettin, G., A. Presbitero, and N. Spatafora. 2015. “Remittances and Vulnerability in 
Developing Countries.” World Bank Economic Review September 29, 1–29.  
Bettin, G., and A. Zazzaro. 2018. The Impact of Natural Disasters on Remittances to 
Low- and Middle-Income Countries, The Journal of Development Studies, 54:3, 481-
500 
Broner, Fernando, Tatiana Didier, Aitor Erce, and Sergio Schmukler. 2013. “Gross 
Capital Flows: Dynamics and Crises.” Journal of Monetary Economics 60 (1): 113–33. 
Bugamelli, M., and F. Paterno. 2009. “Do Workers’ Remittances Reduce the Probability 
of Current Account Reversals?” World Development 37 (12): 1821–38. 
Bugamelli, M., and F. Paterno. 2011. “Output Growth Volatility and Remittances.” 
Economica 78 (311): 480–500. 
Chami, R., D. Hakura, and P. Montiel. 2012. “Do Worker Remittances Reduce Output 
Volatility in Developing Countries?” Journal of Globalization and Development 3 (1): 
1–25.  
Clemens, M. A., and D. McKenzie. 2014. “Why Don't Remittances Appear to Affect 
Growth?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6856, World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
Combes, J.-L., C. Ebeke, M. N. Etoundi, and T. Yogo. 2014. “Are Foreign Aid and 
Remittance Inflows a Hedge against Food Price Shocks in Developing Countries?” 
World Development 54 (1): 81–98. 
Constantinescu, I. C., and M. Schiff. 2014. “Remittances, FDI and ODA: Stability, 
Cyclicality and Stabilizing Impact in Developing Countries.” International Journal of 




Cooray, A., and D. Mallick. 2013. “International Business Cycles and Remittance Flows.” 
BE Journal of Macroeconomics 13 (1): 1–33. 
Contessi, S., P. De Pace, and J. L. Francis. 2013. “The Cyclical Properties of 
Disaggregated Capital Flows.” Journal of International Money and Finance 32 
(February): 528–55. 
Craigwell, R., M. Jackman, and W. Moore. 2010. “Economic Volatility and Remittances.” 
International Journal of Development Issues 9 (1): 25–42. 
Durdu, C. B., and S. Sayan. 2010. "Emerging Market Business Cycles with Remittance 
Fluctuations." IMF Staff Papers 57 (2): 303–25. 
Forbes, K. J., and F. E. Warnock. 2012. “Capital Flow Waves: Surges, Stops, Flight, and 
Retrenchment.” Journal of International Economics 88 (2): 235–51. 
Frankel, J. 2011. “Are Bilateral Remittances Counter-Cyclical?” Open Economy Review 
22: 1–16.  
Giuliano, P., and M. Ruiz-Arranz. 2009. “Remittances, Financial Development, and 
Growth.” Journal of Development Economics 90 (1): 144–52. 
Hoddinot, John. 1994. “A Model of Migration and Remittances Applied to Western 
Kenya.” Oxford Economic Papers 46 (3): 459–76. 
Islamaj, E. 2014. “Industrial Specialization, Financial Integration and International 
Consumption Risk Sharing.” BE Journal of Macroeconomics 14 (1): 33. 
Kaminsky, G. L., C. M. Reinhart, and C. A. Végh. 2005. “When It Rains, It Pours: 
Procyclical Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Policies.” In NBER Macroeconomics 
Annual 2004, Volume 19, 11–82. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Kydland, F. E., and E. C. Prescott. 1990. “Business Cycles: Real Facts and a Monetary 
Myth.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 14: 3–18. 
Laeven, Luc, and Fabian Valencia. 2013. "Systemic Banking Crises Database." IMF 
Economic Review 61 (2): 225–70. 
Lucas, Robert E. B., and Oded Stark. 1985. “Motivations to Remit: Evidence from 
Botswana.” Journal of Political Economy 93 (5): 901–18. 
Lueth, Erik, and Marta Ruiz-Arranz. 2008. “Determinants of Bilateral Remittance 
Flows.” BE Journal of Macroeconomics 8 (1). 
Pallage, S., and M. A. Robe. 2001. “Foreign Aid and Business Cycle.” Review of 
International Economics 9 (4): 641–72. 
Plaza, S. and D. Ratha. 2017. ‘Remittances’, in Global Migration Group (eds.) Handbook 




Knowledge Partnership for Migration and Development (KNOMAD), World Bank, 
Washington, D.C.: 65-78. 
Rapoport, H., and F. Docquier. 2006. “The Economics of Migrants’ Remittances.” In 
Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, vol. 2, edited by S. 
Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier, 1135–98. Amsterdam: North Holland 
Ravn, M., and H. Uhlig. 2002. "On Adjusting the HP-Filter for the Frequency of 
Observations." Review of Economics and Statistics 84 (2): 371–76. 
Ruiz, I., and C. Vargas-Silva. 2014. “Remittances and the Business Cycle: A Reliable 
Relationship?” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 40 (3): 456–74. 
Sayan, S. 2006. “Business Cycles and Worker’s Remittances: How Do Migrant Workers 
Respond to Cyclical Movements of GDP at Home?” IMF Working Paper 06/52, 
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
Singh, Raju Jan, Markus Haacker, Kyung-woo Lee, and Maëlan Le Goff. 2011. 
“Determinants and Macroeconomic Impact of Remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa.” 
Journal of African Economies 20 (2): 312–40. 
Yang, D., and H. Choi. 2007. Are remittances insurance? Evidence from rainfall shocks in 
the Philippines. The World Bank Economic Review, 21, 219–248. 
Yang, D. 2008. ‘Coping with disaster: the impact of hurricanes on international financial 





Figure 1. Remittances and Other Flows to Developing Countries 
(Billions of current US$) 
 
Sources: Data from World Bank World Development Indicators and IMF Balance 
of Payments. 1990-2015. 
Notes: Remittances are based on IMF Balance of Payments Accounts; FDI = 
foreign direct investment, net inflows; Portfolio investment = private debt and 
portfolio equity; ODA = net official development assistance and official aid 
received. 
Figure 2. Remittances and Other Flows across Country Groups 
(percent of GDP) 
 
Sources: Data from World Bank World Development Indicators and IMF Balance 
of Payments. 
Notes: “All countries” includes all countries in the sample. “High remittance” refers 
to a set of countries for which remittances as a percentage of GDP have been 
greater than the median of the sample (1.6 percent of GDP) during the 2006–15 
period. “RCI [Remittance and Capital Flow Intensive] countries” refers to a set of 
countries for which remittances plus either FDI or equity flows have been greater 
than the median (1.6 percent of GDP, 3.0 percent of GDP, and 1 percent of GDP, 
respectively) during the 2006–15 period. FDI = foreign direct investment; ODA = 
official development assistance and aid. ODA includes data only for EMDE 


































Figure 3. Cyclical Properties of Remittances 
A.  Remittances and Business Cyclesa,b 
(fraction of countries) 
 
B. Correlation of Remittances with GDPc 
(Median) 
 
C. Remittances and Capital Inflows 
(fraction of countries) 
 
D. Volatility of Inflows 
(Mean standard deviation) 
 
Sources: World Bank’s World Development Indicators and IMF Balance of Payments. 
Notes:  
a. Cyclicality is defined as the correlation between the detrended real series of GDP and foreign direct investment (FDI), 
official development assistance (ODA), and total inflows (the sum of FDI, portfolio investment [including equity and debt], 
financial derivatives, and other investments). Each series is decomposed into trend and cyclical components using a Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) filter and the sample period is 1980–2015. See the note to figure 2 for definitions of the country groupings. 
b. Remittances are considered procyclical if the correlation between the cyclical components of remittances and output is 
positive and statistically different from zero, countercyclical if it is negative and statistically different from zero, and 
acyclical if the correlation is not statistically different from zero.  









































































Figure 4. Remittances and Capital Inflows during Sudden Stops 
(Index numbers) 
A. 2008 crisis B. Crises other than 2008 
  
Sources: World Bank’s World Development Indicators and IMF Balance of Payments. 
Notes: Values are averages of remittances and net capital inflows for emerging market and developing economies that 
have experienced sudden stop episodes. Index numbers are calculated with a base of 100 for the period three years 
before the sudden stop year (−3). Capital inflows are net, that is, the difference between the amounts brought in by 
nonresidents and the amounts sent out by residents. The horizontal axis denotes years. Zero (0) refers to the year of 


































Table 1. Response of Remittances to GDP Fluctuations in Origin and Recipient 
Economies 
 
Altruistic Insurance Strategic Exchange Inheritance Investment 
Recipient (−) (−) (−) (+) (+) (+) 
Origin (+) Indeterminate (+) (+) (+) Indeterminate 
 
Note: (−) refers to countercyclical; (+) refers to procyclical. Recipient (Origin) refers to countries that 




Table 2. Summary Statistics: Remittances, Capital Flows, and Net Exports 
 
A. Full Sample 










3.09 2.93 1.20 7.38 4.68 -4.31 
Standard deviation 
5.44 5.85 2.17 9.07 6.58 11.93 
Observations 
3,226 3,453 627 2,021 627 2,668 
 
B. By Country Group 











2.25 2.33 1.15 4.87 0.83 -0.31 
Other developing 
4.65 2.89 1.27 10.37 6.19 -8.02 
High remittance 
5.63 3.08 1.23 8.44 5.42 -9.81 
RCI countries 
5.94 4.24 1.43 9.72 5.50 -10.73 
Sources: World Bank’s World Development Indicators and IMF Balance of Payments. 
Notes: The table shows the summary statistics for the ratio of each flow to GDP during 1980–2015. Panel A provides 
summary statistics for the full sample and panel B reports averages across different country groups. FDI measures 
foreign direct investment. ODA covers official development assistance and aid, and Total inflows is the sum of FDI, 
portfolio investment (including equity and debt), financial derivatives, and other investments. See the note to figure 2 









Table 3. Correlations with Output and Capital Flows 
(Correlation coefficient) 
 












0.06 0.22 -0.03 0.20 -0.06 -0.22 
Emerging 
markets 
-0.03 0.28 -0.02 0.15 -0.06 -0.31 
Other developing 
0.10 0.16 -0.01 0.25 -0.07 -0.15 
High remittance 
0.15 0.21 -0.02 0.19 -0.06 -0.25 
RCI countries 
0.18 0.24 0.02 0.21 -0.08 -0.26 
 












 0.07 -0.02 0.08 0.07 -0.05 
Emerging 
markets 
 0.07 -0.03 -0.04 0.11 0.07 
Other developing 
 -0.04 0.18 0.05 -0.10 0.00 
High remittance 
 -0.04 0.09 0.04 -0.14 0.00 
RCI countries 
 0.10 -0.07 0.12 0.03 -0.15 
Sources: World Bank’s World Development Indicators and IMF Balance of Payments. 
Notes: Cyclicality is defined as the correlation between the detrended real series of GDP and the relevant inflow. 
Panel A provides the median correlation of each flow with GDP for each country grouping while panel B reports 
their median correlations with remittances. FDI measures foreign direct investment. ODA covers official 
development assistance and aid, and Total inflows is the sum of FDI, portfolio investment (including equity and 
debt), financial derivatives, and other investments. Each time series is decomposed into trend and cyclical 
components using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter and the sample period is 1980–2015. See the note to figure 2 























 A. Median Correlation of Remittances with GDP 
All Countries 0.06 0.05 0.17 -0.07 0.10 
Emerging 
markets -0.03 0.06 0.14 -0.12 0.29 
Other developing 0.10 0.05 0.21 -0.04 0.12 
High remittance 0.15 0.08 0.27 -0.01 0.04 
RCI countries 0.18 0.10 0.33 0.02 0.02 
 B. Fraction of countries with countercyclical remittances 
All countries 7.4 2.6 5.6 18.5 27.8 
Emerging 
markets 10.5 1.4 10.5 21.1 10.5 
Other developing 3.3 5.2 3.3 13.3 25.0 
High remittance 3.6 4.0 5.4 14.3 35.7 
RCI countries 2.7 3.7 2.7 10.8 40.5 
 C. Fraction of countries with procyclical remittances 
All countries 17.6 3.7 31.5 6.5 38.9 
Emerging 
markets 5.3 5.3 31.6 0.0 47.4 
Other developing 18.3 3.3 35.0 8.3 41.7 
High remittance 28.6 7.1 46.4 10.7 35.7 
RCI countries 29.7 10.8 56.8 16.2 35.1 
Sources: World Bank’s World Development Indicators and IMF Balance of Payments. 
Notes: Remittances are considered procyclical if the correlation between the cyclical components of remittances and 
output is positive and statistically different from zero, countercyclical if it is negative and statistically different from 
zero, and acyclical if the correlation is not statistically different from zero. Median correlation, percent countercyclical, 
and percent procyclical are provided for each country grouping in Panels A, B, and C, respectively. Each time series is 
decomposed into trend and cyclical components using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter and the sample period is 1980–
2015. Remittances and GDP are in U.S. dollars and deflated by home GDP deflator in column (1). Column (2) uses 
the normalization method by Broner et al. (2013). Remittances are first normalized by trend GDP and then standardized 
by de-meaning at the country level and division by its standard deviation. Column (3) reports the correlation between 
the cyclical components of real GDP and nominal remittances (Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh 2005). Columns (4) and 
(5) use the methodologies by Chami et al. (2012) and Pallage and Robe (2001), respectively. The correlations are 
between the cyclical components of real GDP and the ratio of remittances to GDP in the former and between GDP 
and remittances both divided by an import price deflator in the latter. See the note to Figure 2 for definitions of the 









Table 5. Remittances and Capital Inflows during Sudden Stops 
(Index numbers) 




RCI High remittance 
 Remit Inflows Remit Inflows Remit Inflows Remit Inflows Remit Inflows 
−2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
−1 111.7 135.4 118.0 219.3 117.2 201.6 119.6 175.2 116.0 168.1 
0 120.9 90.3 131.7 56.6 125.8 128.0 133.7 106.9 125.4 108.8 
1 126.2 84.3 136.5 165.3 117.0 66.2 127.2 70.2 123.1 71.5 
2 142.7 126.6 160.0 207.1 129.9 99.1 135.9 108.9 136.4 108.6 
Sources: World Bank’s World Development Indicators and IMF Balance of Payments. 
Notes: The timeline is indicated in the first column: −2 indicates value two years before the sudden stop, −1 a year 
before, 0 is the year of the sudden stop, 1 is a year after the sudden stop, and 2 is two years after the sudden stop. 
Values are averages of remittances and net capital inflows for emerging markets and developing economies that have 
experienced sudden stop episodes. Index numbers are calculated with a base of 100 for the period two years before the 
sudden stop year (−2). Capital inflows are net, that is, the difference between amounts brought in by foreign entities 
and the amounts sent out by domestic entities. Data are for episodes after 1990. See the note to figure 2 for definitions 
of the country groupings.  
 
Table 6. Growth Rates of Remittances and Capital Inflows during Sudden Stops 
(percent growth) 




RCI High remittance 
 Remit Inflows Remit Inflows Remit Inflows Remit Inflows Remit Inflows 
−2 11.4 7.8 11.7 −3.2 13.2 14.4 12.5 10.0 15.6 11.8 
−1 11.7 11.9 17.0 26.0 12.6 16.2 11.2 20.7 14.4 17.6 
0 6.6 −14.8 6.8 −25.2 10.6 −25.1 8.7 −25.9 8.5 −21.5 
1 5.7 −10.0 7.5 −10.7 7.2 −16.3 2.2 −6.7 4.6 −12.4 
2 7.6 −8.5 10.6 −2.0 −0.1 −2.5 5.4 6.0 9.1 −2.0 
Sources: World Bank’s World Development Indicators and IMF Balance of Payments. 
Notes: The timeline is indicated in the first column: −2 indicates value two years before the sudden stop, −1 a year 
before, 0 is the year of the sudden stop, 1 is a year after the sudden stop and 2 is two years after the sudden stop. 
Values are averages of growth rates of nominal remittances and net capital inflows across relevant country groups. 
Capital inflows are net, that is the difference between amounts brought in by foreign entities and the amounts sent out 





Appendix: Database, List of Sudden Stops and Additional Results 
Table A1. Database 
Variable Source Frequency 
GDP (constant 2010 US$) WDI Annual 
GDP (current US$) WDI Annual 
GDP deflator  WDI Annual 




Net exports (current US$) WDI Annual 
Remittances* (current US$) WDI Annual 
Total capital inflows** (current US$) BPM6 Annual, Quarterly 
Portfolio equity** (current US$) BPM6 Annual, Quarterly 
Sources: World Bank’s World Development Indicators and IMF Balance of Payments. 
Notes: WDI is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators data set. Variables in current U.S. dollars are divided 
by a home-GDP deflator to obtain them in real terms wherever needed. 
* Remittances include the sum of personal transfers and compensation of employees. 
** FDI measures foreign direct investment and total inflows is the sum of FDI, portfolio investment (including equity 
and debt), financial derivatives, and other investments. These measures are in net (new investment inflows less 




















Table A2. Cyclicality of Remittances, Capital Flows, and Net Exports 
 















Countercyclical 7.4 1.9 11.1 1.9 10.2 46.3 
% Procyclical 17.6 38.9 8.3 10.2 3.7 7.4 




Countercyclical 10.5 0.0 10.5 5.3 10.5 52.6 
% Procyclical 5.3 47.4 5.3 15.8 5.3 0.0 





Countercyclical 3.3 1.7 10.0 1.7 13.3 36.7 
% Procyclical 18.3 30.0 13.3 13.3 3.3 8.3 





Countercyclical 3.6 0.0 8.9 3.6 8.9 44.6 
% Procyclical 28.6 35.7 8.9 14.3 3.6 3.6 




Countercyclical 2.7 0.0 2.7 2.7 8.1 43.2 
% Procyclical 29.7 35.1 10.8 16.2 0.0 2.7 
Observations 35 31 21 30 33 35 
Sources: World Bank’s World Development Indicators and IMF Balance of Payments.  
Notes: Cyclicality is defined as the correlation between the detrended real series of GDP and the relevant inflow. A 
series is considered procyclical if the correlation between the cyclical components of the flow and output is positive and 
statistically different from zero, countercyclical if it is negative and statistically different from zero, and acyclical if the 
correlation is not statistically different from zero. Total number of countries, percent procyclical, and percent 
countercyclical are provided for each country grouping. FDI measures foreign direct investment. ODA covers official 
development assistance and aid, and Total inflows is the sum of FDI, portfolio investment (including equity and debt), 
financial derivatives, and other investments. Each time series is decomposed into trend and cyclical components using 


















Table A3. List of Sudden Stop Events 
Country  Year Country  Year 
Albania* 1997, 2009, 2012 Lao P.D.R. 1997, 2008 
Argentina 1998, 2001 Latvia* 1998, 2008 
Armenia* 1996, 1999, 2001, 2010, 2012 Lebanon* 2004, 2010 
Australia 1991, 1998, 2005, 2008 Lithuania 1999, 2000, 2008 
Austria 1997, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2009 Macedonia, FYR* 2002, 2007, 2009, 2010 
Bangladesh 1993, 2010 Malaysia 2005, 2008 
Belarus 1998, 2003, 2008, 2012 Mexico* 1994, 2008, 2011 
Belgium* 2004, 2006, 2008 Moldova* 1998, 2009 
Bolivia* 1999, 2006 Mongolia* 2006, 2009, 2013 
Bosnia and Herzegovina* 2003, 2008 Morocco 2009 
Botswana 2007, 2010 Mozambique 2002, 2004, 2006 
Brazil 1993, 1995, 1999, 2008 Nepal 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001 
Bulgaria* 1994, 2008 Netherlands 1999, 2004, 2008, 2011 
Cambodia* 1997, 2000, 2009 New Zealand 1997, 2005, 2008 
Canada 1995, 2008 Nicaragua* 1995, 2004 
Chile 1993, 1995, 2000, 2008 Norway 1997, 2001, 2005, 2007 
China 2001, 2008, 2012 Pakistan 1995, 1997, 2008, 2009, 2010 
Cyprus* 2009 Paraguay 2007, 2009 
Croatia* 1998, 2004, 2010 Peru* 1992, 1998, 2005, 2008 
Czech Republic 1996, 2003, 2006, 2008 Philippines* 1993, 1996, 2004 
Denmark 1994, 2001, 2008, 2011 Poland* 2001, 2008 
Ecuador 1996, 2008, 2009 Portugal 1992, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2011 
El Salvador 2003, 2004, 2009, 2012 Romania 1995, 1998, 1999, 2008 
Estonia* 1994, 1998, 2000, 2008 
Russian 
Federation 1996, 1998, 2008 
Ethiopia 1993, 2004, 2007, 2012 Slovak Republic* 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2010 
Finland 2001, 2003, 2009, 2012 Slovenia 1997, 2001, 2008 
France 2001, 2008 South Africa 1998, 2000, 2008 
Georgia* 1999, 2009 Spain 1992, 1994, 2001, 2008 
Germany 1994, 2000, 2008 Sri Lanka 1994, 1995, 1998, 2008 
Greece 1992, 1995, 1997, 2006, 2009, 2010 Sweden 1997, 2001, 2008 
Guatemala 1995, 2008 Switzerland 2001, 2008 
Haiti 2007, 2009 Tajikistan* 2008 
Hungary* 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2009 Thailand 1992, 1996, 2007, 2008, 2011 
India* 1992, 2008 Tunisia* 2012 
Indonesia 1997, 2006 Turkey 1994, 1999, 2001, 2007, 2008 
Ireland 1994, 2001, 2008 Ukraine* 1998, 2008 
Israel 1996, 1998, 2001, 2007, 2011 United Kingdom 2001, 2006, 2008 
Italy 1992, 1999, 2000, 2007 United States 1998, 2001, 2008 
Japan 1992, 1996, 1998, 2005, 2008 Uruguay 2002 
Jordan* 1992, 2001, 2003, 2007 Venezuela, RB 2006, 2008, 2012 
Kazakhstan 1998, 2000, 2007 Vietnam* 2008  
Korea, Rep. 1997, 2008 Zimbabwe 1993 
Kyrgyz Republic* 1997, 2008, 2010   
Sources: IMF Balance of Payments. 
Notes: Sudden stops are defined following Forbes and Warnock (2012). See section 4 for details. RCI 
[Remittance and Capital Flow Intensive] countries are denoted by “*”. In addition, RCI include Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Honduras, Madagascar, Mali, and Niger, which have not had a sudden stop episode 





Table A4. Remittances and Capital Inflows during Currency Crises 
(Index numbers) 




RCI High remittance 
 Remit Inflows Remit Inflows Remit Inflows Remit Inflows Remit Inflows 
−2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
−1 103.2 95.5 110.5 112.3 104.2 96.7 116.4 182.0 117.4 132.9 
0 115.8 43.1 163.3 41.3 101.6 85.8 120.6 57.9 125.1 67.2 
1 105.7 32.4 140.4 32.3 100.9 52.9 104.5 17.5 116.3 42.1 
2 114.6 34.4 159.0 44.6 109.9 15.0 89.1 14.6 109.4 27.3 
Sources: World Bank’s World Development Indicators and IMF Balance of Payments. 
Notes: Crises are based on Laeven and Valencia (2013). The timeline is indicated in the first column: −2 indicates value 
two years before the crisis, −1 a year before, 0 is the year of the crisis, 1 is a year after the crisis and 2 is two years 
after the crisis. Values are averages of remittances and net capital inflows for emerging markets and developing 
economies that have experienced sudden stop episodes. Index numbers are calculated with a base of 100 for the period 
two years before the sudden stop year (−2). Capital inflows are net, that is the difference between amounts brought in 
by foreign entities and the amounts sent out by domestic entities. Data are for episodes after 1990. See the note to 
figure 2 for definitions of the country groupings. 
 
 
Table A5. Remittances and Capital Inflows during Banking Crises 
(Index numbers) 




RCI High remittance 
 Remit Inflows Remit Inflows Remit Inflows Remit Inflows Remit Inflows 
−2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
−1 116.0 128.0 118.8 236.0 141.7 190.1 115.4 104.9 114.7 105.6 
0 120.1 72.5 114.6 −97.2 169.7 144.0 119.2 113.6 118.7 86.9 
1 116.1 97.7 120.8 5.1 157.2 −1.6 106.4 41.1 112.3 35.0 
2 123.9 16.7 132.1 −4.2 173.1 90.4 106.2 52.2 115.0 33.1 
Sources: World Bank’s World Development Indicators and IMF Balance of Payments. 
Notes: Crises are based on Laeven and Valencia (2013). The timeline is indicated in the first column: −2 indicates value 
two years before the crisis, −1 a year before, 0 is the year of the crisis, 1 is a year after the crisis and 2 is two years 
after the crisis. Values are averages of remittances and net capital inflows for emerging markets and developing 
economies that have experienced sudden stop episodes. Index numbers are calculated with a base of 100 for the period 
two years before the sudden stop year (−2). Capital inflows are net, that is the difference between amounts brought in 
by foreign entities and the amounts sent out by domestic entities. Data are for episodes after 1990. See the note to 
figure 2 for definitions of the country groupings. 
 
 
